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Liquidity Management in Islamic Banking: Issues and 
Challenges 
Siti Kholifatul Rizkiah1 
Abstract. As a financial intermediation, banking industry has and will always be bound with 
mismatch maturity problem between asset and liabilities which leads to liquidity issue. This 
article uses a literature study to observe the current liquidity trend in Islamic banking, the 
issues faced by the existing Islamic liquidity instruments and ways to overcome it. It is found 
that the common issues associated with Islamic liquidity instruments are sharia issue, 
inactivity of its secondary market, key issues on short term sukuk issuance and difficulty of 
cross-border transactions. A better management on liquidity position and a more robust 
liquidity infrastructure are needed for a better liquidty management in Islamic banking 
industry. 
Keywords: Islamic banking, liquidity, Islamic liquidity instrument 
Abstrak: Sebagai intermediasi keuangan, industri perbankan selalu dihadapkan pada masalah 
perbedaan jatuh tempo antara aset dan liabilitas yang menyebabkan masalah likuiditas. Artikel 
ini menggunakan studi literatur untuk mengobservasi tren likuiditas bank syariah, masalah 
yang muncul pada instrument manajemen likuiditas syariah dan solusi untuk mengatasi 
masalah tersebut. Masalah yang dihadapi oleh kebanyakan instrumen menejemen likuiditas 
adalah terkait dengan isu syariah, ketidak aktifan pasar sekunder, isu dalam penerbitan sukuk 
jangka pendek, dan tantangan transaksi antar negara. Diperlukan manajemen posisi likuiditas 
yang lebih baik di perbankan syariah dan infrastruktur likuiditas yang lebih matang untuk 
mewujudkan menejemen likuiditas yang baik di industri perbankan syariah. 
Kata kunci: perbankan syariah, likuiditas, manajemen likuiditas syariah 
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Introduction 
There is probably nothing more frightening than experiencing a bank 
run in our financial system. A bank run is when customers rush to withdraw 
their money because they expect the bank to fail which force bank to liquidate 
its asset at a loss and to fail (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Waldo, 1985; 
Postlewaite and Vives, 1987). There has been a number of banks runs that we 
witness in the last decade such as Northern Rock that represents the first bank 
run in the UK history since 1866 (The Economist, 2007) and EuroBlown 
phenomena where a quarter of all deposits were withdrawn from Greek banks 
in two years in the year 2011 (Nymag, 2010). 
Despite the many previous works of literature that argues conventional 
banking structure are more unstable and the system itself prone to crisis as 
compared to Islamic banking (Samad and Hassan, 1999; Beck et al., 2013), the 
bank run episode does not happen only in the conventional bank. A famous 
case of bank run did happen in the Islamic banking history in the year 2011 in 
Ihlas Finans House in Turkey (Hayali et al., 2012). When many banks in an 
economy system suffer a bank run at the same time, it can cause bank panic 
with a disruption in the monetary system. 
            A bank run can happen because banks normally keep only a small 
proportion of their deposit as cash (Bryant, 1980). This is done to make sure 
they can be efficient in using the deposit of customers to generate a maximum 
income. However, a bank should not only focus on profit maximization but 
they also have to be able to meet the withdrawal request from its customer. 
Although there are preemptive actions to combat bank run such as withdrawal 
limit, a good liquidity management should be practiced by all banks. 
According to a survey of industry practitioners and leaders of Middle East 
Islamic Financial Institutions that was conducted by Deloitte (2010), liquidity 
ratio was considered as the top priority in the banking industry. 
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            The purpose of this paper is to present a global view of liquidity 
management in Islamic banks, analyze the current liquidity management 
instruments available in the market, and highlight the issues and challenges. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section Two gives an overall 
overview of the theoretical foundation and highlight policy framework of 
liquidity management in banking industry. Section Three describes the 
research methodology used in this study. Section Four analyse the current state, 
issues and some alternatives for the improvement of liquity management in 
Islamic banking. Section Five concludes the study with policy implications. 
Literature Review 
This section would provide a theoritical foundation on the importance 
and relevance of liquidity risk in banking industry in general. It will also 
explain the existing regulatory framework on liquidity management that 
banking industry has to follow based on Basel III requirement. 
            As discuss in the previous part, Banks face a huge potential liquidity risk 
from their inability to meet their liability obligation when its due without 
incurring large losses in converting their asset into cash (Comptroller of the 
Currency, 2001). This liquidity risk comes from the nature of the Banking 
business in itself. Banks channel the fund deposited by customers to make a 
loan and earn some profit from there. Majority of the fund used in the business 
comes from depositors which are composed mainly of demand deposit. Due to 
this fact, it is important for them to make sure that they are able to meet the 
request from the depositors' withdrawal demand at timely maner. 
            It can also be said that the liquidity risk in banking industry originates 
from the mismatch of maturities between assets and liabilities (Sobol, 2013). 
The asset side of Bank’s financial statement is predominantly composed of 
medium and long-term financing, while the liability primarily consists of short-
term demand deposit. This gap in maturities between assets and liabilities 
creates the risk of not able to meet the requested payment from the depositors 
(Kashyap et al., 2002). This will force a bank to convert or sell their asset into 
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cash with a price much lower than the market price which is a loss to the bank 
(Muranaga and Ohsawa, 2002). 
            A question of why liquidity issue is so important to the banking industry 
can be answered by the impact of a bank run to the whole financial system in 
the country. When a bank collapse because it suffers a run, it will create a 
mistrust of society to banking institutions which can lead to a systemic bank 
run (Brown and Vlahu, 2016). Systemic bank runs or also called as bank panic 
is a situation where depositors are lack of information of the unobservable 
shock across banks and led them withdrawing their deposit because of fear that 
their bank will be unable to repay their deposit (Calomiris and Golton, 1991). 
Bank panic can cause a costly impact such as disruptions of a payment system, 
and credit supply, failure of banks, and suspension of bank debt convertibility 
(Calomiris and Mason, 1994). 
            However, it is also important to point out that an excessive liquidity is 
not profitable for the Bank either (Eljelly, 2004; and Olagunju et. al., 2012). For 
a business that uses depositors money to make a loan and gain profit, holding 
an excessive cash is part of inefficiency for the bank. The bank should maximize 
the fund that it has for productive and profit earning means. Since liquidity 
comes at a cost, a bank should find a balance between the safety of holding 
enough liquid asset and the expense of it (Bordeleau and Graham, 2010). 
The last financial crisis in 2008 teaches us a lesson that the severity of a 
crisis was magnified by excessive leverage, inadequate and low-quality capital, 
and insufficient liquidity buffers (Basel, 2010). The Basel committee and its 
oversight body created a program to address the key lesson learned from 
financial crisis 2008 and establish a new framework to strengthen the resilience 
of banks the global banking system. The objective of this committee is to 
enhance understanding of a key supervisory issue and improve the quality of 
supervisory banking worldwide (BIS, 2016). The new global standards set Basel 
committee addresses firm-specific and systemic risk is what we know as Basel 
III.  
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 On of the three requirements in Basel III is to set the standard of global 
liquidity ratio (Gomes and Khan, 2011). The first liquidity requirement is 
liquidity coverage ratio. This ratio requires banks to have enough liquid assets 
to survive a 30-day  market crisis. Elliott (2014) explained that 30 days was 
chosen as it is viewed to be long enough for the central bank and government 
to take necessary measures to stop a widespread market crisis of liquidity. The 
liquidity coverage ratio is calculated as high quality liquid asset divided by 
total net liquidity outflows over 30 days (Hong et al., 2014). 
LCR = 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
 ≥ 100% 
High-Quality Liquid Asset (HQLA) are assets that can be easily 
converted to cash with little to no loss of value even during times of stress. 
HQLA is divided into two categories which are level 1 and level 2 (Bech and 
Keister, 2017). Level 1 HQLA compromises cash, central bank reserves, and 
securities issued by the central bank, government and some international 
finance agencies. Other qualifying liquid assets are put under level 2 category. 
The second liquidity ratio set by Basel III is net stable funding ratio, this 
ratio is set to ensure banks' asset are supported by adequate stable funding 
sources (Hong et al., 2014). Stable funding sources include Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital, preferred equity and liabilities with maturity more than one year, and 
deposit with maturity less than one year but are expected to stay in the bank 
even in time of crisis. This ratio is done to keep banks from engaging in 
excessive maturity transformation that would be risky for them. It also 
encourages banks to use a longer-term funding and increase the issuance of 
investment account.  
Despite the stability that is keen to be achieved by Basel III, Shearman 
and Sterling (2011) argued that application of Basel III is challenging –most 
especially the liquidity requirements. To meet the compliance of these liquidity 
requirements, Basel committee recommends an assessment of bank’s 
contractual maturity mismatch, the concentration of funding, available 
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unencumbered asset and ability to satisfy liquidity ratios in all relevant 
currencies (BIS, 2009). The implementation of Basel III has also bound to incur 
some significant costs to the bank. 
Härle et al. (2010) from McKinsey Company estimate the 
implementation cost of regulatory compliance (Not including the cost to 
materially improve risk and finance capabilities, capital, funding and balance 
sheet management and to conduct portfolio moves) for a midsize European 
bank will be between €45 million to  €70 million. Not only that, they also 
forecast that the implementation will require resources between 135 to 210 FTE 
years. However, Alkholifey, governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Authority on his speech at the 15th Islamic Financial Stability Forum 
mentioned that the high volume of regulations which take place after the global 
financial crisis 2008 would pay off despite a regulatory pause and increased 
compliance cost for banks (IFSB, 2017). 
Method 
This study explores the current state of liquidity management in Islamic 
banking industry and analyse the issues and challenges faced by the existing 
Islamic liquidity instruments. In doing so, this study uses a qualitative research 
by literature study. For this study, secondary data is obtained from relevant 
literatures such as books, academic researdh, industrial papers and other 
sources. 
Result and Discussion 
This section will explore the current state of liquidity management in 
Islamic banks, the issues and challenges faced by the existing Islamic liquidity 
instruments and a way forward towards a better liquidity management in 
Islamic banking industry. 
Liquidity Management in Islamic Banks 
            In an ideal Islamic bank that uses profit and loss sharing system in their 
operation, should be more stable and not suffer liquidity problems (Sobol, 
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2013). Under profit and loss sharing contracts such as mushārakah, the risk is 
shared proportionally by the bank, depositors, and borrowers. In case of 
mudhārabah contract, the risk associated with the fund is transferred fully to the 
fund owners or depositors. Any risk coming from the financing would 
eventually be being shared by all parties involved. While in the conventional 
bank that uses an interest-based system which makes the bank absorb all the 
risk alone. The default and problem on asset side will lead to an inability of 
meeting obligations on the liability side as the deposit principal is guaranteed. 
Besides that, profit and loss sharing on deposit contracts has a longer-
term maturity as it is an investment contract in nature. This nature of contract 
would solve the main problem of liquidity issue on the asset and liability 
mismatch. Unfortunately, profit and loss sharing is not the majority contracts 
used in Islamic banks (Dar and Parsley, 2000). Most of the deposit products in 
Islamic banks use contracts that behave like demand deposit such as qardh 
hassan and wadiah yad dammanah. These types of contracts have a short-term 
maturity as customers can withdraw their deposit at any time. While on the 
asset sides, Islamic banks use debt based contract such as murabahah, ijarah, 
salam, istisna and bay’ muajjal which behaves similarly with debt based 
financing. Thus, the maturity mismatch between asset and liability still exists 
and Islamic bank still faces potential liquidity problem just like the 
conventional bank. 
 
Figure 1. Maturity Gap in Islamic Banking Accros the Globes (Ali, 2013) 
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According to Ali (2013), the South East Asia Islamic banks have the 
biggest maturity gap prior to financial crisis 2008 (Figure 1). This could be 
explained by the tendency of using debt-based funding and financing contracts 
instead of profit and loss sharing contract. At the same time, the infrastructure 
for Islamic liquidity management was almost non-existence. This gap has been 
tightened since 2008 following the initiative and innovation in sharia liquidity 
management. 
Figure 2. Liquid Assets to Deposits of Islamic and Conventional Banks in 
Malaysia (Wahid and Dar, 2016) 
The conventional bank has a wide range of tools that can be used to 
manage their liquidity problems (Figure 2). Bacha and Mirakhor (2013) 
classifies them into two main components which are interbank deposit system 
and money market instrument. The interbank deposit system is a platform 
where banks can lend and borrow among themselves with a short tenure 
ranging from overnight up to a maximum of one year. These lending and 
borrowing activities charge an interest rate that we know as Kuala Lumpur 
Interbank Offer Rate (KLIBOR). The second component is money market 
instrument which allows banks to manage their liquidity through issuance or 
purchase of debt instruments. The instruments traded in this money market are 
short-term debt papers such as Malaysian Treasury Bills, BNM Bills, Malaysian 
Government Securities, Banker’s Acceptances, Commercial Papers, and 
Repurchase Agreements (Repos). 
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As expected, a majority if not all of the liquidity instruments available in 
the market are interest-bearing instruments which are not allowed to be traded 
by an Islamic bank. Thus, to cater the liquidity problems that might arise, 
Islamic banks are almost 50% more liquid than the conventional bank (Majid 
and Rais, 2003). However, with the more advanced in Islamic banking industry, 
many countries have started to develop and engineer Islamic liquidity 
management instruments. These instruments are short-term financial assets 
that can be traded among Islamic banks such as interbank investment account, 
commodity murabaha, sukuk,  and even establishment of Islamic Money Market 
in Malaysia. 
The development of these liquidity instruments is mainly initiated at 
countries which have sufficient players of Islamic Banks. For countries with a 
small number of Islamic banks, they have little to no option than to trade with 
the central bank. Even so, not all central banks have financial instruments that 
meet sharia requirements as a final recourse for Islamic banks. Some countries 
with only a few Islamic banks or countries with conventional banks that offer 
Islamic windows product are left with no liquidity instrument available. 
Table 1. Islamic Liquidity Management Instrument Across Countries 
Country Instrument Available 
Malaysia Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM)  
Government Investment Issues (GII) 
Islamic Commercial papers 
Bank Negara Malaysia Negotiable Notes (BNNN) 
Bursa Suq Al-Sila’ (Commodity Murabahah) 
Indonesia Pasar Uang Antar Bank (Mudhārabah Interbank Investment) 
Fasilitas Pendanaan Jangka Panjang Syariah (Long term sharia 
financing by central bank) 
Bahrain Sukuk Ijarah and Sukuk Al-Salam by Central Bank 
Reliance on non-interest bearing excess reserve in central bank 
UAE Global Commodity Finance (electronic islamic interbank 
money market) 
Islamic Certificates of Deposit based on commodity 
murabahah 
Pakistan, Brunei, 
Singapore 
Short term sukuk ijarah 
Rest of the world Early stage with no liquidity instrument available 
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Several organizations were also established to foster the stability and 
liquidity management of Islamic banks such as Islamic Financial Service Board 
(IFSB), International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), Liquidity Management 
Centre (LMC), and International Islamic Liquidity Management (IILM) (Sole, 
2007). IFSB is an international organization that sets prudential standards and 
guiding principles to ensure the stability of Islamic financial service industry 
(IFSB, 2017). IFSB is taking the role of reviewing committee for the execution of 
Basel III standard in Islamic Banks. IIFM was created to establish a 
standardization of international Islamic financial market, research and reports 
on Sukuk, and develop an active secondary market that is crucial for liquidity 
management of Islamic banks. 
LMC that was founded in 2002 regulated under the central bank of 
Bahrain was intended to facilitate the flow of investment funds between 
financial institutions and create an active Islamic interbank market (Abdullah, 
2010). While IILM is the latest innovation by 9 central banks to issue sharia-
compliant financial instruments that aim to facilitate cross-border Islamic 
liquidity management (Kusuma and Silva, 2014). 
Issues in Current Islamic Liquidity Management Instruments  
            Recognizing potential problems and inefficiency arising from liquidity 
issue, Islamic financial institutions have evolved and started to develop 
liquidity management tools to be traded among Islamic banks. These liquidity 
instruments and infrastructures are bound to some issues and challenges. 
Commodity Murabahah  
Commodity murabahah is one of the most used instrument to manage 
liquidity risk particularly in Gulf region (El Gamal, 2006). Malaysia has also 
initiated Bursa Suq Al-Sila, an international electronic commodity trading 
platform to facilitate commodity murabahah. The banks with surplus liquidity 
use commodity murabahah to earn some return from the excess cash that they 
have by buying commodity on a spot payment from a party in the commodity 
market, then sell it to another party on deferred payment basis with same 
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markup price. While the banks with a shortage of liquidity can purchase 
commodities from a party in the commodity market on deferred payment with 
mark up price, then sell it to a third party on a spot payment for market price. 
This transaction is also known as tawarruq. 
            The use of commodity murabahah is not without controversy. Tawarruq 
contract has long been a debatable issue among scholars on its permissibility 
(Ahmed et al., 2012; Ismon, 2012; Ahmed and Aleshaikh, 2014; Ndiaye, 2017). 
After the similar contract (bay al-inah), has been deemed non-permissible, 
Islamic finance has evolved it to tawarruq by involving a third party into the 
equation. However, many believe that the ultimate consequence of the 
transaction is the same with bay al-nah and it is merely a hilah or ploy to 
legitimize riba (Noor and Azli, 2009). Not only that, commodity murabahah does 
not tie its transaction with any real economic value as the commodity traded 
are not used for production or consumption (Gholamreza et al., 2012). The 
commodity is not even physically moved from one storage to another as the 
whole transaction are done electronically. Furthermore, according to Ali (2013), 
the use of commodity murabahah has transformed from liquidity management 
tools into a source of fund. If this is done on a large scale, the missing link 
between financial and real economic sectors can lead to a systematic risk. 
            Another problem arising from commodity murabahah is the inability to 
trade in the secondary market. Once the commodity is sold or bought on 
deferred payment basis, it becomes debt which is not allowed to be sold unless 
at par value. Although scholars have different views on the permissibility of 
bay al-dayn or sale of debt at discount to a third party,  Hanafi’s, Shafi’i’s (some), 
Hanbali’s and Zahiri’s scholars are on the opinion that selling it for a lesser 
value is similar to riba as the value of the payment is tied to the time (Amin, 
2007). This inability to be sold in the secondary market makes commodity 
murabahah a less favorable option as a liquidity tools. The nature of liquidity 
management itself will require the instrument to be easily bought and sold on 
the secondary market to balance the liquidity position of the bank. 
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Interbank Deposit Placement 
Interbank deposit placement based on mudhārabah or wakalah is another 
recourse for Islamic Banks to place their excess liquidity (Sobol, 2013). 
However, this will only be possible for countries with many Islamic banks exist 
in the market, or else they would have no partner for the deposit placement. 
The interbank deposit placement is however not a preferred means by Islamic 
bank to manage their liquidity. 
First, the deposit placed in other banks do not meet the criteria of HQLA. 
In order to meet the liquidity coverage ratio set by Basel III, placing liquidity 
excess in HQLA asset is important. Since the Islamic banks where the fund is 
put also faces liquidity problems, interbank deposit also subjects to 
counterparty risk where the other party (other Islamic banks) cannot meet the 
obligation when it is due. 
Another significant problem with interbank deposit placement is the fact 
that banks liquidity position tends to move in a similar manner especially 
during a significant macroeconomic event. For example during a recession, 
most banks will short of liquidity and the interbank deposit will automatically 
disappear since banks do not have the excess fund to be deposited. 
Islamic Interbank Money Market 
Malaysia has pioneered the very first move in the formation of Islamic 
Interbank Money Market (IIMM) in the year 1994. IIMM acts as an intermediary 
between the surplus and deficit banks to channel their fund in order to 
maintain the liquidity position (Bacha, 2008). IMM has a total of twelve 
interbank investment and financial instruments with different underlying 
contracts and maturities (from overnight up to one-year placement). Since 
money market integrates banking system and capital market together, it also 
acts as a channel for monetary policy. 
            Although having an Islamic interbank money market is a big step 
forward, there are some issues and challenges faced by IIMM. The first latent 
problem arises is the usage of the conventional interest rate as a benchmark 
TIFBR | Tazkia Islamic Finance and Business Review 
Volume 12(2), 2018 
 
143 
 
yield. Further according to Bacha (2008), in a dual banking system, Islamic 
banks which issuing IIMM instruments will face higher cost when the interest 
rate rises. However when the interest rate decline, the investors who held IIMM 
instruments will suffer a lower return than those who hold conventional money 
market instrument. 
A discourse of developing an international Islamic interbank money 
market has been brought to bring benefit for the global Islamic finance. 
Unfortunately, this idea raises significant potential problems on its own. It will 
face regulatory issues, a high cost of transactions, taxes, currency fluctuation 
risk, and restriction on cross-border movement of capital. Until the moslem 
countries can come up with a strong union that removes all these hindrances, 
a cross-border Islamic money market will never be possible. 
Table 2. Yearly Islamic Interbank Money Market Transaction (IIMM, 2017) 
Yearly Islamic Interbank Transactions 
Volume (RM million) 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Qard 2,364,646 1,627,437 1,710,800 1,691,752 2,307,740 2,800,673 2,762,559 
Murabahah 56,874 55,423 26,571 71,827 244,585 135,089 68,155 
  2,421,521 1,682,860 1,737,372 1,763,579 2,552,325 2,935,762 2,830,714 
         
Interbank  304,515 399,631 441,803 418,582 90,533 164,787 227,448 
NIDC/INID 26,832 32,811 46,061 62,381 61,746 49,715 55,752 
IMTN/IAB/ 
IPDS/ICP 
67,164 108,092 92,623 72,403 86,721 125,915 99,459 
MITB 528 2,341 2,187 4,050 8,157 7,833 3,809 
BNNN/ 
BNMN/ 
SBNMI 
235,734 312,791 377,363 296,012 43,549 62 - 
GII/SPK 239.810 223,068 226,484 187,462 233,767 334,346 229,281 
          
TOTAL 3,296,106 2,761,596 2,923,895 2,804,473 3,076,799 3,618,423 3,446,466 
 
Salam and Ijarah Sukuk  
The second most familiar instrument traded as liquidity management is 
Sukuk. The widely used contract for Sukuk used as liquidity tools is salam dan 
ijarah contracts. Among countries that use Sukuk are Bahrain, Pakistan, Turkey 
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and Indonesia. Most of the Islamic banks in these countries trade sukuk that 
are issued by the central bank or government. The usage of Sukuk is seen to be 
superior compared to commodity murabahah as Sukuk is mostly issued to 
finance real and specific projects. However the volume of issuance is still quite 
small and in the case of Salam Sukuk, it is not allowed to be traded on the 
secondary market as it would lead to bay al-dayn. 
The limited number of issuance makes it difficult to have sufficient 
sukuk to be traded in the market. Besides the limited number of sukuk issued, 
most of sukuk issued by the government is a long-term maturity since the 
project being financed are mostly medium-long term. A new initiative had been 
taken to issue a short-term international sukuk with the establishment of 
International Islamic Liquidity Management (IILM). Another possible problem 
is sharia issue in ijarah sukuk on the benevolent and legal ownership between 
sukuk holders and issuers. Some scholars believe that the sukuk holders should 
be given both benevolent and legal ownership as they are the true owners of 
the asset. 
IILM Short-Term Sukuk 
Since August 2013, IILM has started issuing USD denominated, short-
term and A-1 SandP rating, sharia-compliant sukuk. It is the first sharia-
compliant money market instruments that use a sovereign asset-backed type of 
Sukuk. The IILM is traded globally and has an active secondary market 
through the primary dealer networks that it formed. Since it is an effort by 
several central banks, it receives favorable regulatory treatments from its 
member of central banks. IILM sukuk also fulfill the criteria of HQLA which 
will help Islamic Banks to meet Basel III requirements while still earning some 
returns from holding the instrument. Onal (2013) mentioned that IILM sukuk 
has the potential to create its yield as a new benchmark curve pricing for Islamic 
finance industry to replace conventional interest rate. 
Albeit its future potential as a highly liquid cross-border tradable 
instrument, IILM sukuk also faces some challenges. As the sukuk relies on the 
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sovereign asset to be securitized for its issuance, it is bound to the limitation of 
a number of sovereign assets available. A government would not be willing to 
securitize too many of its national asset as it will be harmful to the stability of 
the country. Archer and Karim (2014) explained that it would be difficult to 
find countries who are willing to sell their sovereign asset and buy it at a higher 
price. 
IILM sukuk also subjects to some sharia issues on the genuineness of 
sales and lease in its ijarah contract. The sukuk holders do not know the asset 
being traded as the issuers do not declare specifically which asset is being 
securitized, this could lead to a potential gharar issue as the subject matter of 
the contract is not known by the party. Not only that, the benevolent and legal 
ownership status is given to the sukuk holders is also a potential problem that 
might arises in ijarah sukuk. 
There is a possibility of a timing mismatch between the duration of IILM 
sukuk asset and liability. The underlying asset of IILM sukuk is generally 
medium to long-term asset like infrastructure financing, although there could 
be short term asset like commodity murabaha. However, the IILM sukuk itself 
is short term. The nature of the underlying assets in IILM sukuk are different 
from the purpose of usage by the sukuk holders which is for liquidity 
management.  
This could lead to a problem with its coupon and principal payment. 
Although IILM has allocated a time reserve of 2% amount from issuance to 
counter this potential problem, it still opens the possibility of inability to meet 
the obligation on time. This is a crucial issue for liquidity management 
instrument. Lastly, while the usage of USD denominated sukuk will benefit 
Islamic banks with limited liquidity instrument available in their country. 
However, it will also expose them to exchange rate fluctuation risk as the banks 
have to convert the USD to their local currency to meet domestic liquidity 
needs. 
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Towards a Beter Liquidity Management in Islamic Banking 
In pursuance of a better liquidity management, Islamic banks have to 
redefine how they do business and operate their asset and liability. As 
mentioned earlier in this paper, an ideal Islamic bank that practices profit and 
loss sharing contract in the business will not suffer from liquidity risk. Thus, 
imposing the usage of PLS contract in both funding and financing will 
minimize the mismatch maturity between the two side of balance sheet. The 
cash inflow and outflow of asset and liability will move simultaneously as both 
parties share the risk of the project. Bank will only act as intermediaries without 
guaranteeing demand payment from depositors. 
Islamic banks can also apply maturity matching strategies between their 
asset and liabilities. This could be done by channeling short-term funds to 
finance short-term projects, while long-term funds can be used to finance long-
term projects (Mirakhor et al., 2012). This strategy would allow Islamic banks 
to match the cash flow timing between their depositors and borrowers. 
It is also important to institutionalized liquidity risk governance in the 
banking structure to oversee liquidity position and take appropriate measures 
when needed. This could be done by having a special committee for liquidity 
management supported by sharia committee to oversee the sharia compliance 
of liquidity management instruments that the bank uses. Another important 
action to be taken is enacting Basel III requirements in banking policy following 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Since Basel 
III is policy recommendation, its execution is not binding. Only if the central 
banks enact it in the banking policy, it becomes an enforceable law and forces 
all banks to meet the standards. 
It is important for Islamic finance industry to keep their focus on the 
development of sharia-compliant liquidity management instrument. This is 
done to introduce a wide range instruments in regards to the maturities, 
features, and contracts. Having an extensive diversity of instruments will allow 
Islamic banks to choose the best instruments to meet their unique liquidity 
needs. Not only issuing a wide variety of instruments, promoting an active 
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secondary market is equally essential. In order to foster the activity in the 
secondary market, all stakeholders have to take apart. Having an efficient, 
transparent and trustable secondary market will attract a wide pool of players 
which can facilitate the liquidity needs of Islamic banks. 
The central bank should also play their role in this issue. For countries 
with little to no liquidity instrument available, the central bank should be able 
to be the last resort of lender should the Islamic bank faces liquidity problems. 
An interest-free instrument should be made available as a final recourse for 
Islamic banks. Not only that, it would also be an advantage for Islamic banks if 
Central banks hold certain eligible sukuk or other instruments as a part of the 
statutory reserve requirement of Islamic banks. This would allow Islamic banks 
to gain some earning from the idle cash of the reserve management. 
In order to achieve a more stable and robust global Islamic financial 
industry, we need to reinforce the global cooperation among moslem countries. 
Among real actions that can be taken are as follows. First, having a global sharia 
board issuing fatwa that binds all moslem countries will smooth the 
cooperation and cross-border trading of liquidity instruments. Although we 
already have AAOIFI sharia standard, it is not an international fatwa that is 
accepted by all moslem countries in conducting their Islamic finance practices. 
In reality, each country issues a different fatwa which makes it difficult to create 
cross-border initiatives. 
Second, there is a need for standardization of regulatory, pricing 
benchmark, and tax framework. By having a standardized practice of these, it 
would make it easier for transaction among jurisdictions. It will also enhance 
the competitiveness of Islamic financial industry which will attract players 
from outside industry as well. Lastly, to cultivate an international interbank 
money market among Islamic banks, the restrictions of capital movement 
between moslem countries should be removed. 
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Conclusion  
Seeing the nature of the business, liquidity risk is among the top priority 
concern of banking industry. The magnitude of the problem is even bigger for 
Islamic banks as the liquidity management instruments available are limited. 
Previously, Islamic banks tend to hold more liquid asset than the conventional 
bank which impacts badly on its profitability and efficiency. Now, with the 
advancement and development of Islamic financial service industry, the 
infrastructure and tools for liquidity management have evolved rapidly. 
However, current liquidity instruments are bound to challenges pertaining its 
sharia issue, inactivity of its secondary market, key issues on shotrt term 
issuance and difficulty of cross-border transactions. 
This study is important for the key stakeholders to take appropriate 
policy and action. With regard to managing a better liquidity, it is important 
for Islamic banks to promote the usage of PLS contracts in both asset and 
liability of Islamic banks. Having a specific committee to oversee day to day 
liquidity position in the bank will help Islamic banks have a better management 
of their liquidity. The banking regulator shall also enact Basel III requirements 
in banking policy would to foster the stability and liquidity management in 
Islamic banks. A wider diversity of liquidity instruments with different 
maturities, features and contracts are needed. Besides that, promoting an active 
secondary market is just as important as developing the tools. The central bank 
should also play its role as the last resort of lender and place reserve 
requirements in profitable instruments. Lastly, the global cooperation among 
moslem countries should be reinforced to promote international interbank 
money market. 
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